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ARGUMENT
I.

THE APPELLEES' ADDITIONAL ISSUES RAISED ON APPEAL IS
UNSUPPORTED AND SHOULD BE DISMISSED.

The Appellees' request for a dismissal of the Appellants' appeal by raising an additional
issue. (Respondents' Brief p. 18-20). However, this issue is unsupported and should be
dismissed. The Appellants have cited the proper standard of review for the Court to review this
case and have properly asked this Court in multiple places throughout their opening brief to
reverse the District Court's decision. (Appellants' Brief p. 9, 15, 16-17, 22, 28). In addition, all
of the issues raised on appeal relate directly to whether the District Court erred when making its
decision. Id. at 3. Furthermore, the Appellants did cite the Losser 's "Matter of Procedure" by
citing case law from Nicholls, Ustick, and Pope Intermountain Gas. Id. at 5. These cases
articulate that the Supreme Court does not review the Magistrate's decision, but it only reviews
the District Court's decision by either affirming or reversing the District Court's decisions. Id.
Since the Appellants have cited and articulated the proper standard and have asked the Court to
review the District's Court decision instead of the Magistrate's decision, this Court should
respectfully dismiss the Appellees' request for dismissal.
The Appellees not only raise the additional issue above, but also assert that the
Appellants have failed to raise any legal issue on appeal. Id. at 20-21. They argue that the only
issues that have been raised are issues of fact. However, this is incorrect. The Appellants filed a
Notice of Appeal raising both questions of fact and law. (R. Vol. I, p. 102, L. 5). Additionally,
the Appellants have cited three different standards of review in their opening brief. (Appellants'
Brief p. 3-4). These standards are the Clearly Erroneous, De Novo, and the Abuse of Discretion

standard. Throughout Appellants' briefing the Appellants have argued both error in fact and law.
Specifically, Appellants have argued that the District Court erred when it affirmed the
Magistrate's decision that no error in law occurred relating to the accounting, inventory, and the
reasonable sale of the home. (Appellants' Brief p. 14 & 23). It is clear from Appellants' Brief
that issues of fact and law have been raised. Appellees' additional issues are unsupported and
should be respectfully disregarded by this Court.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S RELIANCE ON PARTS OF JUDGMENT II
WAS NOT HARMLESS ERROR AND MATERIALLY PREJUDICED
THE ARGUMENTS RAISED BY APPELLANTS.

Although the Appellees clearly admit that the District Court erred by citing parts of
Judgment II, the Appellees still argue that the District Court's reliance on Judgment II was
harmless error and the District Court's Decision and Order should not be reversed.
(Respondents' Brief p. 21-25).This argument is unsupported. Appellants assert that the District
Court's reliance on Judgment II was and is materially prejudicial to them. The District Court
solely relied on Judgment II to conclude that the Court had conducted findings of facts and
conclusions of law relating to the issues of the inventory and accounting. (R. Vol. I, p. 236).
When the Appellants filed their Notice of Appeal, briefed the appeal, and argued the appeal there
was no Judgment II. (R. Vol. !(generally)). It was obvious to the Appellants when they filed their
appeal that the Magistrate erred because there were no findings. After the appeal was closed,
Judgment II was created to clean up the Magistrate's errors because it was obvious the
Magistrate had failed to conduct findings of facts and conclusions of law relating to the
inventory and accounting. According to the District Court, Judgment II perfected the
Magistrate's errors because the District Court cited it in its briefing. Id. at 236. The Court
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specifically cited it to support its holding that the Magistrate conducted findings of facts and
conclusions of law. Id. at 236. The District Court's reliance on Judgment II led to the District
Court eventually holding that the appeal was pursued frivolously, unreasonably, and without
foundation. Id. at 289. The analysis is easy to determine whether prejudice existed. If one asks
but for Judgment II would the District Court have concluded that the Magistrate issued findings
of facts and conclusions of law? The answer is clearly no. Obviously, without Judgment II the
District Court would have overturned the Magistrate on appeal. A court sitting in an appellate
capacity cannot appropriately conduct an appellate review unless it has findings of facts and
conclusions of law. See Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 52, see also State v. Islas, 443 P.3d 274,
284 (Idaho Ct. App. 2019). The Court obviously cannot analyze or review a decision that does
not have these findings. Id. Further, if a court cannot analyze or review a decision without
findings, it certainly cannot determine whether the Court erred or not. Therefore, it is clear that
the Appellants were materially prejudiced.
Judgment II also materially prejudiced the Appellants because if Judgment II was a valid
document which included the findings of facts and conclusions of law, the District Court should
not have dismissed the Appellants' issue in regards to the timing and adequacy of the inventory.
As argued above, the District Court relied on Judgment II to hold that the Magistrate conducted
findings of facts and conclusions law relating to the inventory and accounting. (R. Vol. I, p. 236).
The findings in Judgment II concluded that the Personal Representatives performed a sufficient
inventory for the property owned by decedent, as required by Idaho Code§ 15-3-706 and that the
Personal Representatives provided a copy of the inventory of the property owned by decedent, to
the devisees, as required by Idaho Code § 15-3-706. (R. Vol. I, p. 236). Judgment II proves that
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issues of adequacy and timing of the inventory were raised at the trial level. Nevertheless, the
District Court held that the Appellants' argument on appeal which raised issues of the adequacy
and timing of the inventory were not properly raised and dismissed that issue. (Id).
The Appellees' brief also argues that the timing issue cannot be raised on this appeal. The
Appellees state, "To the extent Jodi, Cindy and John raise the timing issue here, it should be
disregarded under Judge Simponson's ruling." (Respondents' Brief p. 26). However, if this Court
allows the District Court to rely on Judgment II, the District Court's holding to dismiss this issue
would be an error. Judgment II clearly holds that the Magistrate found that the inventory was
sufficiently prepared and was timely provided to Cindy, Jodi, and John in accordance with Idaho
Code§ 15-3-706. (R. Vol. I, p. 210-211, see also R. Vol. I, p. 236). These findings by the
Magistrate in Judgment II prove that the Appellants' raised the timing and adequacy of the
inventory and accounting at the Magistrate level. It is logical to conclude that if such issues
weren't raised at the trial level, the trial court would not have made these findings and
conclusions.
A party also has a right to appeal a final judgment. See Idaho Appellate Rule 11. When a
party raises an appeal, the appellate court reviews the findings of facts and conclusions of law.

See I.R.C.P. 52(a). These findings of facts and conclusions of law represent the issues that are
raised on appeal. Judgment II included findings of facts and conclusions of law relating to the
timing and adequacy of the inventory. (R. Vol. I, p. 210, L. 1 & 2). The Appellants had a right to
appeal the Final Judgment and raise issues on appeal with regards to the adequacy and timing of
the inventory. As a result, the District Court's dismissal of this issue was inappropriate.
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Judgment II's preudical effect to the Appellants is plainly clear.

For example, if

Judgment II is an invalid document, then there were no findings of facts and conclusions of law
and the Magistrate should have been overturned. However, if Judgment II is a valid document,
then the District Court erred in dismissing the Appellants' argument raising the issues of the
timing and adequacy of the inventory.
Lastly, the Appellants were prejudiced because Judgment II provided additional findings
of facts and conclusions that were not part of the original record. If the Appellants would have
been given these findings of facts and conclusions of law before their appeal, the Appellants
could have postured the appeal differently and made different arguments. Since the Appellants
had no opportunity to adjust their appeal or make new arguments regarding these new issues, it is
clear that Judgment II materially prejudiced them.
Judgment II materially prejudiced and affected the substantial rights of the Appellants in
the appeal. The Appellants were denied their right to address the findings of facts and
conclusions of law that were issued in Judgment II. This affected their ability to make proper
arguments on the appeal. Additionally, the District Court's reliance on Judgment II changed the
outcome of the appeal as argued above. Therefore, the District Court erred and this Court should
respectfully reverse the District Court's decision.
III.

THE APPELLEES ADMIT THAT THE INVENTORY WAS NOT TIMELY
PREPARED AND THE ACCOUNTING WAS INCOMPLETE.

To further support that the District Court erred in affirming the Magistrate's decision in
regards to both the inventory and accounting, the Appellees admit that the inventory was not
submitted on time and the accounting was incomplete. (Respondents' Brief p. 27 & 29).
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The Appellees now argue that even if the inventory was inadequate and untimely, there
was no prejudice to the Appellants. Id. However, this is not the standard of review on appeal.
The District Court was required to review whether the facts were clearly erroneous or whether
the magistrate erred in law. The Magistrate's findings in Judgment II that the personal
representatives prepared a sufficient inventory of the property owned by decedent, as required by
Idaho Code§ 15-3-706 and that the Personal Representatives provided a copy of the inventory of
the property owned by the decedent, to the devisees, as required by Idaho Code§ 15-3-706 were
clearly erroneous. The non-conflicting facts in the record, along with the Appellees' admissions,
support the conclusion that the Personal Representatives failed to prepare an inventory within the
90 day period and they failed to file the inventory with the Court or provide a copy to Cindy,
Jodi, and John according Idaho Code § 15-3-706.
Even if this Court entertains the Appellees' argument that there was no prejudice created
from the delay, the Court would easily recognize that this argument is unsupported. The
Appellants objected in writing indicating they needed more information and that the inventory
and accounting was incomplete. (R. Vol. I, p. 73). Appellants' counsel argued that the late
disclosures of these items along with the incomplete accounting, provided grounds to not close
the estate. (TR Vol 1. p. 33). Additionally, Appellants' counsel argued that he needed additional
time to prepare his case. Id. Nonetheless, the Appellants, with the limited time frame given to
them, provided evidence that there were multiple items missing from the inventory. Id at 55-57.
Specifically, Appellants testified that there were several items missing from the estate Id. These
missing items specifically included vehicles. Id.

Unfortunately for them, the Magistrate

punished Cindy, Jodi, or John, and held that they should have searched those titles on their own
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and should have prepared better. Id at 78. However, the Appellants didn't realize that the items
were missing from the estate until they were given the final inventory at the hearing. At this
point it was too late to go search for the titles. The delay in preparation and distribution
prejudicially led to the Magistrate punishing them for lack of preparation. Additionally, the
Appellees were granted administration fees for the preparation of this inventory. Id at 222. Since
the Appellees failed to properly conduct the inventory adequately and in the timeframe of Idaho
Code§ 15-3-706, the Appellees should not have been granted these fees.
The Appellees further argue that the Appellants remedy is not clear and this Court should
deny the appeal. (Respondents' Brief p. 28). However, this is unfounded. According to their
argument in Losser, this Court is bound to either affirm or reverse the District Court's decision.
The Appellants have requested that the Court reverse the District Court by ( 1) remanding the
case back to the Magistrate to conduct new findings of facts and conclusions of law, (2) remand
the case back to the Magistrate because it's findings of fact that the inventory was conducted
adequately and timely according to Idaho Code § 15-3-706 was clearly erroneous, and (3) the
Magistrate erred in law. Obviously, if this Court reverses the District Court on either fact or law
and remands the case back to the Magistrate the court will have to conduct a rehearing in
determining what losses or if any losses were caused by the Personal Representatives late
disclosures and whether if the Personal Representatives should be given their fees in regards to
the inventory.
The non-conflicting facts and the Appellees' admissions prove that an inventory was not
completed according to Idaho Code § 15-3-706. This Court has remedies to clean up the errors
made by the District Court. Therefore, this Court should reverse the District Court's decision
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which affirmed the Magistrate's holding that the inventory was properly completed and
conducted according to Idaho Code§ 15-3-706.
Not only do the Appellees admit that the inventory was inadequate and untimely
prepared, the Appellees admit that the accounting was never completed and mistakes were made.
(Respondents' Brief p. 29). Appellees again argue that the failure to complete the accounting and
the mistakes made within the accounting are harmless. Id. Additionally, the Appellees argue that
the Magistrate's exercise of discretion was proper and sound. Id. at 30. However, these
arguments are unfounded. Before an estate can be closed the Personal Representatives of the
estate must conduct a final account in order to complete the settlement of the estate. See In re
Estate of Spencer, 106 Idaho 316,318,678 P.2d 108, 110. In addition, interested parties have a

statutory right to compel the Personal Representatives to make a full accounting before the estate
is settled and closed. (Idaho Code § 15-3-1001). This Court has stated, "Idaho Code §
15-1-201(42) provides that "'settlement,' in reference to a decedent's estate, includes the full
process of administration, distribution and closing." (Emphasis added.) "The settlement of an

estate consists in its administration by the executor . . . so that nothing remains but to make a
final distribution." See In re Estate of Spencer, 106 Idaho 316, 318, 678 P.2d 108, 110. In this
case a full settlement of the estate was not completed. The non-conflicting facts and the
admissions by the Appellees prove that it was not.
The Appellees also argue that the mistakes made by the Personal Representative, Rodeny,
were minor and harmless. (Respondents' Brief p. 29-30). The Appellees have inappropriately
provided a hypothetical proving that the loss was small. Id. However, this hypothetical amount
should be dismissed as it was never part of the record. There was no testimony or evidence to
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prove that the loss was that minor. (TR. Vol. I (generally)). In actuality, Rodney could not
explain the amount of loss because he did not have the documents or provide the documents to
the Appellants as part of the final accounting. Id at 40. Even today, the Appellants have no idea
the actual total amount ofloss that was created by Rodney's breach of his duties.
In addition, the Appellees' argument that the Magistrate exercised proper discretion in
closing the estate is unfounded. (Respondents' Brief p. 30). On appeal the District Court was
required to review this issue under a clearly erroneous or a de novo standard. The review was not
supposed to be conducted under an abuse of discretion standard. The non-conflicting facts along
with the Appellees' admissions prove that the final account was incomplete and had mistakes.
The Magistrate's findings to approve the final accounting are clearly erroneous. The District
court erred in affirming the Magistrate's decision on the accounting and should be reversed.
Additionally, the Magistrate's conclusions of law relating to the accounting seem to be as
follows; if the accounting is partially complete and has only minor errors then the estate may be
closed. (TR. Vol. I, p. 300, L. 8-12: 78). This conclusion oflaw is an error. The law is clear that
an estate cannot be settled until everything has been fully completed. See In re Estate of Spencer,
106 Idaho 316, 318, 678 P.2d 108, 110. This means that the accounting has to be completed by
the Personal Representatives before the closure of the estate. Further, if any interested party
demands for a full account of the estate, then the Personal Representatives must produce the full
account before the estate is closed. See Idaho Code § 15-3-1001.
As a result, the Magistrate erred in both fact and law when it closed the estate without a
proper and complete accounting. The District Court erred in affirming the Magistrate's decision.
Therefore, this Court should reverse the District Court and remand this case back to the
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Magistrate to allow a full accounting to be completed and allow the Appellants the proper timing
to assess any losses and prepare their case against the Personal Representatives.
The District Court and the Appellees both confirm that five written objections were
raised at the final hearing. (Respondents' Brief p. 29, see also R. Vol. I, p 69-70). This Court has
stated, "We hold that where objections are raised to an accounting and report in the
administration of a decedent's estate and a contested hearing is held concerning those objections,
the court must, under I.R.C.P. 52(a). make findings of fact and enter conclusions of law in
respect to the objections and the account." See In re Estate of Spencer, 106 Idaho 316, 321
(Idaho Ct. App. March 13, 1984). Although the Appellees made the argument that the District
Court addressed the objections, the Magistrate never made any specific findings to any of the
written objections raised. (Respondent's Briefp. 29, see also, TR. Vol. I, p. 297-306: 78-80).
The District Court erred in affirming the Magistrate's decision that a complete and
reasonable accounting was conducted by the Appellees. The Magistrate never made any specific
findings to the written objections raised by the Appellants. Furthermore, if the March 27th, 2017
record does satisfy the requirements of findings of facts and conclusions of law, these findings
were clearly erroneous and contained errors in law. Therefore, this Court should reverse the
District Court and remand this case back to the Magistrate.
IV.

APPELLEES ADMIT THAT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION STANDARD
SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN APPLIED IN DETERMINING THE
INVENTORY AND ACCOUNTING AND REASONABLE SALE OF THE
PROPERTY.

In the Appellants' opening brief, Appellants argue that the District Court erred when it
applied an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing whether the Magistrate erred in its findings
of facts and conclusions of law relating to inventory, accounting, and reasonable sale of the
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home. (Appellants' Brief p. 15-17). The Appellees in their response agreed and state, " Simply
stated, we agree the "abuse of discretion" standard has no application to a trial court's findings of
fact." (Respondents' Briefp. 310). The Appellees' brief then goes on to make arguments about
the Magistrate's discretion in determining facts or discretion in applying the facts to the law. Id.
This argument misses the main point of the Appellants' argument and most of the Appellees'
argument is irrelevant. The Appellants' argument argues that the District Court applied the
wrong standard of review, not that the Magistrate exercised improper discretion relating to the
inventory, accounting, and reasonable sale of the home.
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals has emphasized how important it is for Courts to
apply the right standard of review. The Appeals Court asserted that:
Standards of review balance the power among the courts, enhance judicial
economy, standardize the appellate process, and give the parties in a lawsuit an
idea of their chance of success on appeal. All of these policies are interconnected.
And, when appellate court judges use standards of review faithfully and
consistently, these principles are upheld. An examination of the policies
underlying standards of review leads to an appreciation of their role in judicial
decision making and an appreciation of the significant negative effect brought
about when they are misunderstood, manipulated, or ignored.

State v. Islas, 443 P.3d 274, 284 (Idaho Ct. App. 2019) (Citing Amanda Peters, The Meaning,
Measure, and Misuse of Standards of Review, 13 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 233, 238 (2009)
"[W]hen used properly, standards of review require appellate judges to exercise self-restraint."

Id. at 284.
The District Court applied the abuse of discretion standard to the trial court's Findings of
Facts and Conclusions of Law regardings the inventory, accounting, and reasonable sale of the
home. (Appellants' Brief p 15-17, see also R. Vol. I, p. 229 & 248). This was reversible err.
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Since the District Court erred by applying the wrong standard, this Court should respectfully
reverse its decision.
V.

THE APPELLEES ADMIT THAT THE COURT PLACED TIME
CONSTRAINTS AT HEARING WHICH LIMITED THE ABILITY TO
CALL WITNESSES.

The Appellees argue that the Magistrate Court did not exclude any witnesses, but instead
argue that the Court did place time restraints at the hearing which caused some witnesses to be
excluded. (Respondents' Brief p.36). In essence the Appellees are arguing semantics. Whether
the Magistrate specifically ordered an exclusion of the witnesses or limited the timing of the
hearing which then excluded witnesses, the effect was the exact same thing. Again the exclusion
of the witnesses were directly tied to the Co-Personal Representatives failure to complete the
inventory and accounting. Appellees agree and cite to the same findings in which the Appellants
cite in their opening brief that supports the Magistrate's decision to deny the continuance and
exclusion of witnesses. (Respondents' Brief p. 36-37, see also Appellants' Brief p. 20). The
Magistrate rationale for denying the continuance and hearing was all based on criticizing the
Appellants by not conducting discovery, subpoenaing bank records, or calling expert witnesses.
(TR. Vol. I, p. 300-301: 78-79). This rationale was unfair and unreasonable. The Magistrate
criticized the Appellants even when they did not have a duty to perform those items but then
gave the Personal Representatives a pass even though they failed to perform their statutory
obligations. Furthermore, all the parties desired to call Mark Call as a witness and made it known
to the Magistrate. Id. at 34. Moreover, all the parties requested that the Court continue the
hearing because of the untimely disclosure of the inventory and incompleteness of the
accounting. Id. The Court under these circumstances should have allowed the parties more time
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to prepare for the final hearing and granted the continuance. The Magistrate abused its discretion.
Therefore, the District Court erred in affirming the Magistrate Court and its decision should be
reversed.
VI.

THERE ARE CLEAR FACTS AND EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THAT
THE SALE WAS UNREASONABLE.

The Appellees argue that no admissible evidence was offered or admitted to explain why
the sale price was less than the appraisal price and therefore the sale was reasonable.
(Respondents' Brief p. 38). This argument is unfounded. The Appellants in their opening brief
cite multiple non-conflicting facts that were testified to at trial which support that the sale was
unreasonably sold. (Appellants' Brief p. 23-24).
The Appellees also argue that the Personal Representatives did not cause any loss from
the sale because there were numerous potential explanations as to why Mr. White did not
complete the loan process. (Respondents' Brief p. 39). This argument is again unfounded. John
White II specifically stated, "They said that my loan wouldn't apply to that property, that, in
order for--it was an FHA loan-- for that type of loan to be applied to that property, that the
people selling it would have to deem it as real property. It was a trailer home." (TR. Vol. I, p.
199-200, L. 23-25: 53). This evidence directly contradicts the Appellees assertions that there
were no facts presented to prove why John II' s financing was turned down.
The Appellees further raise multiple questions with respect to the property about whether
the mobile home could have been converted into real property. (Respondents' Brief p. 39).
However, these questions raised are irrelevant. The evidence is non-conflicting that the Personal
Representatives were informed that they could have changed the title of the property into real
property. (TR. Vol. I, p. 154-155, L. 13-1: 42). They admitted that they were informed and did
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nothing to change the title. Id. They had an offer from John White II for $65,00. Id. at 51 & 53.
This was $15,000 more than the offer they accepted. This offer failed because of the nature of
the title not because John White II did not qualify. The Personal Representatives did not act
within the best interest of the estate and did not make the necessary steps to increase the value of
the estate. In actuality, by not acting it led to a direct loss to the estate.
Finally, the Appellees just like the Magistrate and District Court, argue that the
Appellants should be blamed for the lack of evidence produced at the trial court even though the
Appellees failed to perform their own duties. (Respondents' Brief p. 40). Again this argument
does not have anything to do in determining whether the sale was reasonably sold. This argument
supports the Appellants' original argument that the Magistrate Court erred by not conducting
findings of facts and conclusions of law in determining that the sale was reasonable. The only
findings and conclusions are that the Appellants should have procedurally done something more.
(Appellants' Brief p. 22-24).
The Magistrate failed to make any findings of facts and conclusions of law that the sale
of the property was reasonably sold. However, if this Court finds that the March 27, 2017
hearing record contains findings of facts and conclusions of law then those findings are clearly
erroneous. The facts clearly support that the sale of the home was unreasonably sold.
Furthemore, the law applied to conclude that the sale was reasonable was a clear error. The
Appellants respectfully requests that the Court reverse the District Court decision affirming the
Magistrate's findings that the sale was reasonably sold.
VII.

THE APPELLEES DID NOT CLAIM ATTORNEY FEES PURSUANT TO
IDAHO CODE 12-121 ON THE APPEAL FROM THE MAGISTRATE TO
THE DISTRICT COURT.
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The Appellees argue that they made a claim for attorney fees on appeal from the
Magistrate Court to the District Court. This is incorrect. The Appellants cited the Appellees
entire attorney fee section in their briefing. (Appellants' Brief p. 25-26). In that section the
Appellees actually argue against citing Idaho Code § 12-121. Id. They wrongly determined that
Idaho Code § 12-121 was the old law in claiming fees under a probate case. Id. They asserted
that Idaho Code § 15-8-208 was the new law and the new way in asserting fees. Id. However, the
Appellees failed to analyze that Idaho Code § 15-8-208 can only be asserted for fees when
TEDRA is invoked. See Quemada v. Arizmendez, (In re Estate of Ortega, 153 Idaho 609, 288
P.3d 826 (2012), see also R. Vol. I, p. 268-269. The District Court held that TEDRA was not
invoked in this case and denied the Appellees fees under this statute. (R. Vol. I, p. 288). 1 This
Court has held that even if Idaho Code § 12-121 was cited, it must be accompanied by an
argument and request. See Bagley v. Thomason, 149 Idaho 799, 805, 241 P.3d 972, 978 (2010),

Pocatello Hosp., LLC v. Quail Ridge Med. Inv'r, LLC, 156 Idaho 709,721,330 P.3d 1067, 1079
(2014). Although the Appellees can argue that Idaho Code § 12-121 was actually cited in the
brief through a case they copied and pasted, they cannot genuinely assert that they made a
request for fees under Idaho Code § 12-121.
Additionally, the Appellees cite sections of the District Court's Decision and Opinion to
support that he conducted findings of facts and conclusions of law in an analysis for attorney
fees. (Respondents' Brief p. 43-45). However, the District Court granted fees pursuant to Idaho
Code § 12-121 on the Petition for Rehearing. (R. Vol 1, p. 287-289). The District Court failed to
issue any findings of facts or conclusions of law. Id. The Appellees' citations of the District

1

This is not an issue on this appeal.
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Court's Decision and Order to support that the appeal was pursued frivolously, unreasonably,
and without foundation is their own rationale and not the District Courts. Furthermore, the
Appellees' argument fails to even address that the Appellants actually prevailed in part.
Pursuant to the arguments raised above, the District Court erred in granting the Appellees
fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121 and its decision should be reversed.
CONCLUSION
The District erred in affirming that the Magistrate issued findings of facts and
conclusions of law; applying the wrong standards of review; affirming that the Magistrate did not
err in either fact or law relating to the inventory, accounting, or the reasonable sale of the home;
and affirming that the Magistrate Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the continuance
and excluding witnesses. Therefore, the Appellants respectfully request that this Court reverse
the District Court's decision and implement the proper remedies to remedy the errs
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